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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to empirically estimate the propensity for alcohol-related policies to influence
rates of entry into foster care and the length of time spent in foster care.  Alcohol consumption is believed
to be major contributing factor to child maltreatment, associated with an increased likelihood of abuse
and longer durations once in foster care.  We analyze a panel of state-level foster care entry rates over
time, followed by a duration analysis of individual-level cases.  The alcohol regulations of interest
include beer, wine, and liquor taxes and prices, and a measure of alcohol availability.  Overall, these
alcohol control policies appear to have limited power to alter foster care entry rates and duration once
in care.  We find that higher alcohol taxes and prices are not effective in reducing foster care entry
rates, however, once in foster care, the duration of stay may be influenced with higher taxes, particularly
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1.  Introduction 
Parental substance abuse problems can be extremely detrimental to the health and well 
being of children. Children of substance abusers are at a much greater risk of physical, mental, 
and sexual abuse, and suffer more physical and mental health problems than children in the 
general population [Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA) 2001; Puttler et al. 
1998]. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration estimates that 
approximately 5.156 million children live with parents who abuse or are dependent on alcohol 
(Office of Applied Studies 2003).  
Nearly 1 million children annually are victims of child abuse and neglect. Estimates of 
alcohol involvement in cases of maltreatment range from 40 to 70 percent of all cases (Famularo, 
Barnum, and Wharton 1986; Children of Alcoholics Foundation 1996; CASA 2001). Some of 
the children of substance abusing parents will have encounters with state child protective 
services, and these children may be temporarily or permanently separated from their parents in 
order to provide a safe and stable environment. The problems related to parental substance abuse 
places a tremendous burden on the child welfare system. The U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (USDHHS 1999) states, “…it is clear that throughout the child welfare system, 
but especially with respect to children in foster care, alcohol and other drug abuse are recognized 
as major contributing factors to child neglect and abuse and are two of the key barriers to family 
reunification.” The burden of substance abuse problems translates into an estimated annual $5.3 
billion of state spending for child welfare and over $10 billion in combined federal, state and 
local government spending (CASA 1999, 2001).  4 
The close association of parental alcohol abuse and the maltreatment of children suggests 
that alcohol control policies can play a tremendous role in improving the lives of abused 
children.  In this paper, we examine the relationship between alcohol control policies and the 
most severe cases of child abuse—those resulting in the child’s removal from the home and 
placement into child protective services.   Specifically, we estimate the propensity for alcohol-
related policies to influence rates of entry into foster care and the length of time spent in foster 
care.   
This research has implications for not only the current situation of these children, but for 
their future success as well.  Research has linked abuse during childhood to adverse outcomes 
such as delinquency and poor mental and physical health, which in turn have implications for 
labor market outcomes later in life (Widom 1989; Felitti et al. 1998; Smith et al.  2005; Tekin 
and Markowitz 2008).    
The link between excessive alcohol consumption or alcohol abuse and child abuse, which 
has been found in many studies, does not necessarily imply causality from the former behavior to 
the latter. It is possible that variations in one or more unobserved “third variables” may cause 
these behaviors to vary in the same direction (see Markowitz 2000 for a discussion of the 
causality issue as it relates to domestic violence). Nevertheless, the studies showing a high 
prevalence of alcohol abuse and dependency among parents of abused children provide the 
motivating context for this study.   Estimates of alcoholism among parents of abused children 
range from 38 percent to 69 percent (Behling 1979; Famularo et al. 1986). Studies find that 
parents of abused or neglected children have much higher reported substance use than 
nonabusive parents. For example, Kelleher et al. (1994) control for some possibly confounding 
variables and find that parents of abused (neglected) children are 2.7 (4.1) times more likely to 5 
have a substance abuse problem than other parents.  DeBellis et al. (2001) also show a higher 
incidence of alcohol and/or substance abuse or dependence disorders among parents of 
maltreated children as compared to sociodemographically similar parents of non-maltreated 
children.  
In substantiated cases of child abuse and neglect, one-third to two-thirds are believed to 
involve parental alcohol abuse or abuse of other drugs, although estimates go as high as 97 
percent (USDHHS 1999; CASA 1999). Alcohol is the primary culprit in these reports. One 
report found that alcohol was involved in 77 percent of cases and was more harmful than drugs 
(cocaine, primarily) in 64 percent of the cases (USDHHS 1999).  
The most severely maltreated children may end up removed from the home and placed in 
foster care. Sixteen percent of families with a substantiated case of child abuse have the child 
removed to foster care (USDHHS 1998). Among foster care children, research has shown that 
children coming from families with substance abuse problems remain in foster care longer than 
other children and are more likely to enter the system multiple times (Frame et al. 2000; Frame 
2002). These children are also more likely to be neglected than abused (Walker et al. 1994).  
The effectiveness of alcohol control policies in improving the lives of children is an 
understudied area in the disciplines of economics and public policy.  Previous research 
approaches the study of the alcohol-violence relationship using the large body of economic 
literature on the demand for alcohol (see Grossman 2005 for a survey of this literature). This 
literature demonstrates that alcohol consumption and excessive consumption are inversely 
related to the price of alcohol and to measures of its availability. The latter variables include the 
minimum legal drinking age, the number and types of outlets that are permitted to sell alcohol, 6 
and statutes pertaining to alcohol advertising and server liability. Based on this literature and on 
the well documented relationship between alcohol and domestic violence, Markowitz and 
Grossman (1998, 2000) and Markowitz et al. (2010) show that higher alcohol prices and 
restricted availability are effective in reducing the incidence of child abuse.  
Markowitz and Grossman (1998) uses data from the 1976 National Family Violence 
Survey  to estimate models in which the incidence of child abuse is affected by the state excise 
tax rate on beer, illegal drug prices, marijuana decriminalization, laws restricting alcohol 
advertising, the per capita number of outlets licensed to sell alcohol, and demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics of parents. Violence measures are collected in the survey by use of 
the Conflict Tactic Scale (CTS). The CTS gathers information on the number of times in the past 
year a parent has committed a violent act by first asking questions about verbal solutions to 
disagreements and building up to questions on the occurrence of violent acts. Results from this 
study show that increasing the tax on beer can be an effective policy tool in reducing violence. 
The findings imply that a 10 percent increase in the tax on beer would reduce the probability of 
severe violence by 2.3 percent and the probability of any degree of violence by 1.2 percent. The 
estimates suggest that a 10 percent hike in the beer tax would have lowered the number of 
severely abused children by about 132,000 in 1975.   Markowitz and Grossman also find that 
laws designed to make obtaining beer more difficult also may be effective in reducing violence. 
These laws include “dry” county laws, laws prohibiting beer sales in grocery stores, and liquor 
outlet densities. However, restrictions in advertising and increases in illegal drug prices have no 
effects on child abuse.  
In a follow-up study on child abuse, Markowitz and Grossman (2000) pool data from the 
1985 and 1976 National Family Violence Surveys to establish two important results. First, 7 
violent acts against children committed by females are much more responsive to beer taxes than 
similar acts committed by males. One explanation of this finding is that alcohol consumption by 
females is more sensitive to the price of alcohol than alcohol consumption by males. Second, by 
pooling the two surveys with a set of state dummies, the authors establish that the negative tax 
effects for females are not due to unobserved state factors. In particular, the magnitude of these 
effects are largely unaffected by the inclusion of the state dummies.  
In a more recent paper, using data from 1994 to 2004, Markowitz et al. (2010) focus on 
an objective measure of child maltreatment as opposed to parental reports.  These data capture 
the most severe cases – cases that are serious enough to warrant investigation by child protection 
services.  The results show that higher taxes and prices of beer, liquor, and ethanol are negatively 
related to maltreatment rates and child fatalities.  Restrictions on alcohol in the form of fewer 
licensed outlets per capita, are also associated with improvements in child welfare.   
Freisthler (2004) and Freisthler et al. (2005) examine the relationship between alcohol 
outlet densities and rates of child abuse. These papers both find that areas in California with 
higher densities of alcohol outlets also have higher rates of child maltreatment. The results of 
these studies must be interpreted with caution as it is impossible to know whether the abusers are 
choosing to locate in areas with high-density outlets or whether the availability of alcohol 
contributes to the abuse.  
Economists have also examined other determinants of child abuse using the state-level 
panel data used in this paper.  For example, Paxson and Waldfogel (2002) examine the ways in 
which children are affected by the economic circumstances of the parents. Bitler and Zavodny 8 
(2004) and Seiglie (2004) also examine state-level panels of child abuse and neglect, with a 
focus on the effects of abortion restrictions in reducing child maltreatment.   
This current paper expands on the previous literature by examining the effectiveness of 
policy on the most severe cases of child abuse—those resulting in the child’s removal from the 
home and placement into child protective services.  While previous research has shown children 
coming from families with substance abuse problems remain in foster care longer than other 
children and are more likely to enter the system multiple times, it is not clear whether stricter 
alcohol control policies can alter these outcomes.  It is possible the relationship between alcohol 
and foster care entry may reflect other unobserved factors about the family’s life, rather than be a 
true causal relationship.  As we discuss below, estimating the reduced form equation, which 
directly links the policies to the outcomes, will help shed light on the nature of the relationship 
between alcohol consumption and child abuse.   
 
2.   Analytical Framework  
The framework for this project involves two well-established relationships: the 
relationship between alcohol consumption and the maltreatment of children, and the negative 
relationship between alcohol consumption and the full price of alcohol. If a parent’s alcohol 
consumption leads to an increased risk for child maltreatment, then following the law of demand, 
an increase in the price of alcohol should reduce consumption and thereby reduce the risk of 
maltreatment. The “reduced form” equation directly relates alcohol prices and policies to the 
outcome of interests, entry into foster care and the duration of foster care placement. This 
strategy has been used extensively in the economics literature to study the role of alcohol 9 
policies in reducing the negative outcomes associated with consumption (Cook and Moore 1993; 
Markowitz and Grossman 1998, 2000; Dee 2001; Chesson  et al. 2000; Markowitz et al. 2003).  
We seek to answer two main questions in this paper:  1) are higher alcohol prices and 
reduced availability effective in reducing entry into the foster care system,  and 2) are strict 
alcohol control policies effective in reducing duration in foster care, once a child is placed in the 
system. 
We begin with an analysis of entry rates into foster care.  The empirical equation is as 
follows:   
(1)  Ln(Fjt) = α0+ α1Pjt + α2Xjt+ α3λj+ α4τt + jt. 
Equation (1) shows the determinants of foster care entry rates (F) for state j in time t 
(quarters from 1998-2004). The vector P represents the full price of alcohol, which will be 
measured with alcohol prices and the number of licensed outlets per capita.  The model includes 
variables designed to capture observed characteristics of the state (X) as described below. In 
addition, state dummies (λ) will capture unobserved time-invariant state-level effects which may 
influence entry rates. Time dummies (τ) will capture secular trends.  Because of skewness in 
these data, we analyze the log of the entry rates.  We estimate the rates with Weighted Least 
Squares (WLS) with the population of children as the weight, and adjust the standard errors for 
unknown heteroskedasticity and within-state cluster correlation (Bertrand et al. 2004).  A 
negative binomial regression count model is used where the rates contain a large proportion of 
zeros.  These models are also adjusted for population and within-state cluster correlations. 
Second, we use hazard models in order to estimate the effect of the full price of alcohol 
on the duration of time spent in foster care.  To do so, we divide time into three-month intervals 10 
(quarters), indexed by t.  We observe foster care spells from 1998 to 2004 giving us a total of 28 
quarters of observation.  The discrete time hazard rate is the probability that a child leaves foster 
care in period t, conditional on staying in foster care up to this period.  To estimate this model we 
chose a complementary log-log (extreme value) specification.  The complementary log-log 
model is  
(2) hi,t = 1-exp{-exp[θ(t) + β’Pjt,+ γXjt, + λj }}  <=> 
log[-log(1-hi,t)] = θ(t) + β’Xi,t   
where Pi,t, Xi,t  and λj are the fixed and time-varying characteristics, β and γ are coefficient 
vectors and θ(t) represents the parameterization of the baseline hazard.  In the duration models X 
includes individual characteristics, age at entry into foster care, gender, race, ethnicity and 
whether or not the child had a disability, along with the state characteristics.  We chose a flexible 
form for the baseline hazard using indicators for each quarter.   
 
3.  Data  
Data on foster care entrants come from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and 
Reporting System (AFCARS).  This is a federal data collection system that collects event level 
information for all children removed from their parents and placed in foster care, including the 
date of foster care entry and exit for each child, information on the child’s demographics, 
disabilities, reasons for removal, and foster care case goals.   
Entry rates 
The AFCARS data is used to create counts of the number of children entering foster care 11 
every quarter.  Termed “removals,” this count includes new entrants into the foster care system 
along with children who previously have been in foster care and are re-entering in the current 
year/quarter.  We focus on entrants rather than the total number in care so that we can more 
closely match the alcohol variables to the date of the abuse and subsequent removal from the 
home. 
One advantage of the AFCARS data is that the reason for removal is reported for each 
case.  We use this information to create an additional dependent variable of the number of 
children removed because of an alcohol abusing parent.  In this data, alcohol abuse is defined as 
“the principal caretaker’s compulsive use of alcohol that is not of a temporary nature” (National 
Data Archive on Child Abuse and Neglect 2002).  Since not all cases of abuse are alcohol-
related, this second dependent variable will identify the group of parents who are known to 
regularly consume alcohol.  The drinking behaviors of all adults are potentially affected by 
changes in the full price of alcohol, however, the determinants of the decision to drink may be 
very different from the determinants of quantity among the heaviest drinkers.  This dependent 
variable therefore will allow us to isolate the effects of alcohol policies on behaviors of alcohol 
abusers.  Note that this variable is not our primary focus because of the potential for alcohol to 
be a distal or indirect cause of abuse when it is not recorded as the immediate cause.   
Next, we employ as a dependent variable the number of children removed because of the 
child’s alcohol problem.  This is a relevant outcome because youth alcohol consumption is 
influenced by alcohol control policies (Grossman et al. 1998; Nair et al. 2001) and because 
children of parents who abuse alcohol may be more likely to abuse it themselves (Grant 1998; 
Otten et al. 2008).   12 
The foster care removal data are available beginning in 1995; however, most states did 
not begin reporting until 1998, so this is the first year of our panel.  In 1998, all but 8 states 
provided annual foster care data.  In 1999, Nevada was the only state not to provide data and by 
2000, all states reported.  Our data collection ends in 2004.
1  Fewer observations are available for 
counts of removals due to child or parent alcohol abuse because many states did not begin 
reporting until later years of the data. The states of Alaska, Illinois, New York, and Wyoming 
never reported child or parent alcohol abuse as the primary reason for removal. These states are 
excluded from the analyses when removals due to child or parent alcohol abuse are the 
dependent variables. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table 1.  As can be seen from this 
table, entry into foster care entry is fairly common.  Average quarterly counts for the number of 
foster care entries range from 110 to 15,421 with a mean quarterly rate of 1.4 entries per 1,000 
children.  Entry rates as a result of alcohol abuse are much less common with mean quarterly 
rates of 0.14 and 0.02 per 1,000 children for parent and child alcohol abuse, respectively.  Entry 
counts from parental alcohol abuse ranges from 0 to 1,752.  Zeros occur twelve times in this 
data, accounting for 1 percent of the observations.
 2   Zeros are much more common in the entry 
rates for child alcohol abuse, accounting for 13 percent of the sample.  Because of the large 
number of zeros and the small range of values here, we use a negative binomial count regression 
model to estimate these counts.   
                                                 
1 The liquor price series collection by ACCRA ends in 2004.  Also, the variation in alcohol taxes (which is a source 
of variation for price) is very limited after this date as no state changed its beer tax change between 2004 and 2008.   
2 Zeros are replaced with a value of 0.5 before taking logs.  Negative binomial count models were tested with the 
zeros included.  Results for are very similar to WLS models.   13 
 
Length of stay 
For the duration analysis, we include only the first entry observed into foster care.  Note 
that some children are never reunited with a parent, for instance, if the parent died or is in prison.  
Because the AFCARS data identify the case goal for each child and we are able to select only 
those children for whom the goal is reunification with parents.  For other children, whose goals 
are emancipation, adoption or similar, administrative and legal proceeding may be more salient 
in determining length of stay than alcohol policies.  These are excluded.  When reunification is 
possible, alcohol control policies may be a relevant determinant of length of stay if the policies 
have influence on adult drinking behavior. For each child duration is measured in calendar 
quarters in order to match our alcohol control variables. 
As with the entry rates, we use the information on reason for removal to analyze 
durations among only those children who were removed because of an alcohol abusing parent or 
because the child was abusing alcohol.   Table 1 shows the average duration of a foster care stay 
is 10.3 quarters for all children, 10.8 quarters for children of alcohol abusing parents, and 9.1 
quarters for children who were removed for abusing alcohol. 
 
Alcohol Price and Availability    
Average retail prices that are inclusive of state and federal taxes for beer, wine, and 
liquor are published quarterly by ACCRA in the Inter-City Cost of Living Index for between 250 
and 300 cities across the United States.  The liquor price is for a .75l bottle of J&B Scotch, the 
wine price is for a 1.5l bottle of Livingston Cellers or Gallo Chablis Blanc, and the beer price 14 
reported is for a six pack of Budweiser or Miller Light (through 1999) and Heineken thereafter.   
We generate state average annual prices by using a population weighted average of the city 
prices present in each state.  All prices are deflated by the CPI and the ACCRA cost of living 
index.  We have also adjusted the beer price data for the brand change.    
The ACCRA price data have some limitations.  Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2003) 
discuss the potential measurement error contained in the price series, stemming in part from the 
data collection process and the focus on urban areas.  Ruhm et al. (2011) also cite issues with the 
lack of representativeness of the beverage prices, which can be particularly erroneous when 
consumers substitute from higher to lower price alcoholic beverages.  To avoid these issues, 
many researchers use alcohol taxes instead of prices or instrument for prices using taxes.  
Unfortunately, during our sample time frame, only seven states raised their beer and wine taxes, 
and six changed the liquor tax.  There is simply not enough variation in these taxes to identify 
the effects of taxes on price or the foster care outcomes.  Ruhm et al. (2011) recommend using 
Uniform Product Code scanner data prices.  In their paper, they find that the ACCRA prices are 
overstated compared to alcoholic beverages sold in grocery stores.  In their analysis, however, 
they necessarily omit states where alcohol is not sold in grocery stores, which limits the number 
of states analyzed.    
  At present, the ACCRA prices are the best option available to us.  While the price level 
may be overstated, our estimation relies on changes in the prices, not the level per se, and Young 
and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) find the ACCRA prices track national trends very well.  The 
ACCRA price differences will be driven by primarily by changes in factors such as 
transportation costs, distribution costs and the competitive environment, with tax changes as a 
minor portion of the price (Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz, 2002).  In addition, the focus on 15 
urban area prices may not be problematic for a study of foster care.  For example, Malm et al. 
(2011) show that 75 percent of children adopted from foster care are from urban or suburban 
areas. 
The beer, wine, and liquor prices are too highly correlated to include in the same 
regression, so the models presented in the tables below include each price separately.  In 
addition, we use a summary measure representing the price of an ounce of pure ethanol.  This 
price is generated by computing the price on an ounce of ethanol in each beverage and then 
averaging, using the fractions of total ethanol consumption accounted for by beer, wine, liquor, 
respectively as weights.  These weights are fixed over time and are averages for the U.S. as 
whole during our sample period.   
The availability of alcohol is an important component of the full price, so all models 
include the number of retail outlets per 100,000 population that are licensed to sell liquor for on-
premise or off-premise consumption.  These data come from Jobson’s Liquor Handbook.  With 
larger percentages of populations living in dry counties or with fewer outlets available, travel 
time to obtain alcohol increases, adding to the full price of alcohol.  If alcohol consumption 
contributes to child maltreatment, then it is expected that policies which make obtaining alcohol 
more costly will reduce the incidence of maltreatment.
3  
  Equations 1 and 2 also include state characteristics which may help determine child abuse 
rates.  In all models we will include the female labor force participation rate, the unemployment 
                                                 
3 The percent of a state’s population living in dry counties is another potential availability measure.  This variable 
was tested in the models but suffers from limited variation during our sample period and is therefore is not included.  
However, results suggest that areas with larger populations in dry areas have lower foster care entry rates.  These are 
available upon request. 16 
rate, real income per capita, the percentage of the population living in rural areas, and the 
percentage of the population 25 years and over that has obtained a bachelor’s degree.  The 
percentages of each state’s population identifying with certain religions (Catholic, Protestant, 
Southern Baptist, Mormon) are included as well.  All models also include state dummies to help 
to capture any unobserved time-invariant state effects which may influence child maltreatment 
and may be correlated with the alcohol control policies.   
Lastly, we test specifications with total spending per child population on child welfare 
programs in the state.  This spending represents total dollars from federal, state, and local 
sources.  These data are available biennially from 1996-2004.  We have interpolated the odd 
years from 1995-2003 using rates of growth.  We include this variable to help account for the 
resources dedicated to each state’s foster care systems since states with more resources may be 
more likely or able to remove children from their homes.  It is possible that this variable is 
endogenous in that states with more need for child welfare programs may allocate more 
resources towards this activity.  We tested models that exclude this variable and the results of the 
alcohol price and policy variables remain unchanged.    
  
Entry rates   
  Table 2 shows the effects of alcohol taxes on the all-cause (columns 1-3) and the alcohol-
related foster care entry rates (columns 4-6 for alcohol abusing parent, columns 7-9 for alcohol 
abusing child).  Three models are shown for each outcome, each containing either the beer, wine 
or liquor price.  Models were run using the derived ethanol price are not shown but the results 
are discussed in the text.  All models in the tables also include the number of liquor outlets per 17 
capita, the state characteristics, per capita total spending on child welfare, year indicators, quarter 
indicators and state fixed effects.     
The results in Table 2 show that the coefficients on all the alcohol prices are statistically 
insignificant with the sign varying depending on the price and outcome under consideration.  The 
same holds for the computed ethanol price.  Liquor outlets also are not associated with changes 
in all-cause foster care entries or with parental alcohol abuse entry.   However, more liquor 
outlets are statistically associated, at a 10 percent significance level, with an increase  in foster 
care entries for the reason of child alcohol abuse.  The coefficients here indicate that each 
additional outlet per capita is associated with an increase in foster care entries by 1.1 percent. 
Only a few of the other include state-level variables explain the variation of entry rates 
into foster care.  Higher rates of female labor force participation and a few of the religion 
variables are the only other control variables that are statistically associated with the all cause 
entry rate (at the 10 percent level).  States with more highly educated populations and less rural 
populations are associated with fewer foster care entries due to alcohol abusing parents.  
However, none of these state level variables are associated with entry rates for alcohol abusing 
children.   
 
Duration analyses 
We first examine the nonparametric Kaplan Meier survivor function (Figure 1) 
examining the curves separately for individuals in states with high and low beer prices.  In the 
first quarter, the empirical survivor function is obtained by calculating one minus the proportion 
who leave foster care.  More generally, the survivor function each quarter is the product of one 18 
minus the exit proportion, i.e., the proportion who leave foster care among those still in foster 
care in a given quarter, over the number of quarters to date.  In Figure 1, states with high prices 
are those with prices at the 75
th percentile or above, while states with low prices are those below 
the 25
th percentile.  As predicted, the higher line reflects the higher survivor rates for individuals 
in states with lower prices, meaning more individuals stay in foster care each quarter than in high 
price states.  The lower line represents the quarterly survivor estimate in states with higher 
prices.  The figures also illustrate that the exit rates are high initially and fall rapidly during the 
first few quarters.   In the figure, the overall trends appear to be proportional in high and low 
price states although the differences decline over time.  
  The effects of the determinants of foster care duration are reported in Table 3 with the 
set-up similar to that of Table 2.  Table 3 shows the hazard ratios and t-statistics associated with 
the coefficients.  Values of hazard ratios greater than one indicate that the covariate increases the 
exit probability and, therefore, decreases the time to leaving foster care, while values less than 
one increase the time to exit.  
We find higher beer prices are associated with faster exit times for all three causes but the 
effect is statistically significant only for the all cause model and for alcohol abusing children. 
Wine prices also have a positive effect, but here the effect is statistically significant only for the 
alcohol abuse parent models.  In other words, our analysis provides some evidence that once 
children have been removed from the home, individuals become more responsive to alcohol 
prices and, thus, children are able to exit foster care more quickly.  The liquor price has a 
contradictory negative effect in two of the models.  It is not clear why this would occur, but we 
note that the magnitude of the effect is small.  In addition, liquor outlets are associated with 
lower hazard rates in the all cause models indicating that more licensed outlets are associated 19 
with a slower exit time and a longer time in foster care.  The effect of ethanol is not statistically 
significant in any of the models.  
In terms of demographic variables, males have lower hazard rates, except among children 
who abuse alcohol where results are the reverse.  Hispanics and blacks have lower hazard rates 
(longer lengths of stay) and these results are statistically significant across all specifications at 
the 10 percent level or better.  Having a disability works in a similar direction with lower hazard 
rates for children with disabilities.   In contrast, older children have higher hazard rates, but of 
course they may age out of the system more quickly.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
  This paper seeks to evaluate whether strict alcohol control policies can be effective in 
reducing the maltreatment of children as measured by entry into foster care and the duration of 
stay in care.  We consider the prices of beer, wine, and liquor and a composite price for pure 
ethanol.  To represent the availability of alcohol, we include the per capita number of outlets 
licensed to sell liquor.     
We first examine the determinants of entry into foster care, but find that higher prices of 
beer, wine, liquor, and ethanol are not effective in reducing these entry rates.   However, once in 
foster care, the duration of stay may be shortened with higher prices.  That is, increases in 
alcohol prices, which can be achieved through increased excise taxes, appear to have some 
ability to alter duration once in care.   20 
We estimate a hazard ratio of 1.16 for beer in the all-cause models, but a one unit 
increase would be a significant increase over the mean beer price of $2.62. As an alternative we 
estimated the predicted survival after one year if the beer tax were increased by 25 cents.  The 
predicted mean survival is 75.6 percent at one year, but drops to 53.6 percent with a 25 cent 
increase in the beer tax, holding all other variables at their mean values.  For wine taxes, in cases 
with an alcohol abusing parent, the predicted mean survival at one year drops by less than one 
percentage point from 78.6 percent to 78.1 percent with a 25 cent increase in the wine tax.    
We also find limited evidence that the availability of alcohol as measured through outlets 
will be helpful in improving the lives of children.  We do find that fewer outlets are associated 
with reduced foster care entry rates alcohol abusing children, but not for entry from other 
reasons.  We also find that fewer outlets licensed to sell liquor are associated with reductions in 
the duration of time in foster care for all causes, but again, this result is challenged by the lack of 
effectiveness where we would expect to find stronger results, in the alcohol abuse models.   The 
effectiveness of restrictions on alcohol outlets to reduced foster care entry and duration is limited 
at best.   
One conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that the factors that determine the 
entry into foster care are very different from those that determine the length of time in foster 
care.  In the case of the initial removal, it is possible that those who abuse alcohol are heavy 
consumers and are relatively price insensitive.  This would explain why we do not see any 
effects of higher prices on entry rates.  Research by Manning et al. (1995) confirms very inelastic 
demand among heavy users.  However, once the child is in foster care, adults may have the 
motive to change behavior and higher alcohol prices may facilitate decreased consumption and 
promote reunification with the child.   21 22 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  Quarterly, 1998-2004 (N=1,341) 
 Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
Foster care entries count  1776.13  2177.36  110.00  15412.00 
Foster care entries rate per 1,000 children  1.40  0.71  0.35  7.25 
FC entry, parent alcohol abuse count  157.79  253.97  0  1752.00 
FC entry, parent alcohol abuse per 1,000 children  0.14  0.24  0  2.12 
FC entry, child alcohol abuse count  26.06  49.27  0  554.00 
FC entry, child alcohol abuse per 1,000 children  0.02  0.04  0  0.41 
Length of time (quarters) in foster care, all causes  10.26  8.16  1  27 
Beer price  2.62  0.29  1.67  3.42 
Wine price  3.30  0.49  1.93  4.52 
Liquor price  11.53  1.46  7.11  15.36 
Ethanol price  0.82  0.10  0.50  1.06 
Liquor outlets per 100,000 state population  124.70  62.41  13.27  398.14 
Child welfare spending per child population  288.84  236.09  60.35  2099.27 
College education  25.78  5.11  15.30  46.40 
Female labor force participation rate  61.20  4.26  47.70  71.20 
Real income (in $1,000s)  16.51  2.66  11.99  27.58 
Unemployment 4.78  1.20  2.20  8.80 
Percent rural  27.66  15.13  0  62.90 
Mormon 2.97  9.69  0.09  67.21 
Southern Baptist  6.89  9.47  0.11  32.47 
Catholic 19.84  12.21  3.13  53.72 28 
Protestant 18.45  8.67  2.82  44.68 
  Person Level (N=462,923) 
 Mean  Std.  Dev  Min  Max 
Number of quarters in foster care  10.26  8.16  1  27 
Number of quarters in foster care, alc abusing parent  10.81  8.12  1  27 
Number of quarters in foster care, alc abusing child  9.07  8.06  1  27 
Male 0.52  0.50  0  1 
Hispanic 0.14  0.35  0  1 
Ethnicity missing  0.13  0.34  0  1 
Black 0.25  0.43  0  1 
Race missing  0.18  0.38  0  1 
Age at entry  7.75  5.58  0  18 
Disability 0.14  0.35  0  1 
Disability missing  0.08  0.26  0  1 
Note:  All monetary variables expressed in real (1982-1984) dollars.  29 
Table 2 
Foster Care Entry Rates 
 



















Beer price  0.018 
(0.19) 
            
            
            
            
0.058 
(0.25) 
            
            
            
            
-0.144 
(-0.41) 
            
            
            
            
Wine price              
            
-0.079 
(-1.64) 
            
            
            
            
0.006 
(0.05) 
            
            
            
            
-0.124 
(-0.65) 
            
            
Liquor price              
            
            
            
-0.011 
(-0.39) 
            
            
            
            
-0.057 
(-1.22) 
            
            
            
            
-0.095 
(-1.24) 




































College  education  0.011  0.010  0.011  -0.043 -0.044 -0.044  -0.012 -0.012 -0.010 30 
(0.83) (0.72) (0.86)  (-2.07)  (-2.04) (-2.14)  (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.31) 
















































































































































N  1228 1228 1228  1093 1093 1093  1084 1084 1084 
Price  elasticity  0.046 -0.261 -0.129   0.153  0.020 -0.660  -0.380 -0.411 -1.098 
Note:  t-statistics in parentheses and intercept not shown.  All models include year, quarter and state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered by state.  Columns 1-6 
are log-linear models estimated with weighted least squares.  Columns 7-9 are estimated with negative binomial regression. 
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Table 3 
Proportional Hazard Models 




















Beer price  1.164 
(6.33) 
   1.090 
(1.08) 
   1.522 
(2.52) 
  
Wine price    1.015 
(0.96) 
   1.096 
(1.81) 
   1.160 
(1.36) 
 
Liquor price      0.989 
(-1.90) 
   1.008 
(0.36) 
   0.919 
(-1.67) 
























































































































































































































































































































































N  4,645,973 4,645,973 4,645,973   413,860 413,860 413,860   47,980  47,980  47,980 
Ll  -5.90E+05 -5.90E+05 -5.90E+05  -4.80E+04 -4.80E+04 -4.80E+04   -7.60E+03 -7.60E+03 -7.60E+03 
Note:  Non-parametric baseline hazard; hazard ratios, t-statistics in parentheses.  Models also include state and year/quarter fixed effects. There are 462,923 
individuals in the cause models, 39,857 in the parent alcohol models and 5,434 in the child alcohol models.  